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TODAY'S PREDATORY
LENDING TACTICS REQUIRE
NEW STRATEGIES - AND
NEW LAWS: HOW A CASE
FROM CHICAGO HELPED
CHANGE ILLINOIS LAW
by DANIEL P. LINDSEY AND LEA A. WEEMS
Tjwo years ago, Effie Knight' changed everything.
Before Effie, our project attorneys spent most of their time representing
homeowners in foreclosure. Most of our clients had been caught up in preda-
tory loans: (too) easily available subprime loans whose terms our clients did
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not understand and which they could not afford. These clients were in over
their heads and facing foreclosure. We filed claims on their behalf under the
Truth in Lending Act, the Illinois Interest Act, the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and other state and federal laws. These
were our classic "predatory lending" cases. The goal was to reduce our clients'
mortgage debt and refinance them into smaller, affordable loans.
Oh, for those simpler times.
Two years ago, Effie Knight walked into our office and presented us with a
new, more complex type of predatory lending. Effie wasn't facing foreclosure:
she was being evicted. If we didn't do anything, she would lose her home in
weeks, not months. She would have no chance to refinance her mortgage debt,
no chance to sell her home, no chance to receive a surplus at judicial sale.
Instead, she would be evicted, lose all of her equity and walk away with
nothing.
Effie was just the beginning. We began getting more and more calls from
people who were being evicted from the homes they had owned and lived in
for 10, 20, 30 years. While there are variations on the theme, the pattern is
the same. Foreclosure rescuers buy lists of homeowners being sued in foreclo-
sure. The rescuers send out mass solicitations to these homeowners promising
to save their homes. Enticed by this promise, the homeowner meets with the
rescuer and enters the rescuer's "program." Invariably, the program involves
some form of sale-leaseback with an option to repurchase. The homeowner
conveys title to a third-party investor (or "straw buyer"), makes monthly pay-
ments and retains the option to buy the property back after a set period of
time (usually one or two years).
In the vast majority of cases these deals fail because the homeowner never
reacquires title. This is not surprising, given the homeowners' initial financial
distress, the fact that the new monthly payments are often unaffordable and
the fact that the repurchase price is almost always unaffordable.
It is also common that the deal is greased with vague promises of credit repair.
The result is almost inevitable - the homeowner defaults on the monthly pay-
ments or on the agreement to repurchase and faces eviction (or foreclosure on
the new mortgage loan taken out by the investor to "buy" the property).
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As a result, the rescuer and investor end up with the homeowner's equity,
either taken out of the property at the time of the investor's new loan, or
through resale of the property. That is why this phenomenon is often called
"foreclosure equity-stripping."
In short, the rescuers do not do any real underwriting to make sure that the
deal is financially sound. They simply offer the deal and play on the hopes
and fears of desperate homeowners while knowing they will profit greatly if the
deal fails.
Sometimes it is even worse. Homeowners are misled as to the nature of the
program and do not even realize they are conveying title. Documents are
forged or signed in blank and filled in later. False statements are made as to
the amount of the monthly payments or repurchase price. Material facts are
omitted; for instance, that the investor is going to encumber the property with
a new, higher mortgage, or resell the property to someone else. This is why,
though the term "foreclosure equity-stripping" is apt, we use the term "foreclo-
sure rescue fraud."
Whatever the variation on the theme, the clients we see are losing both their
home and their remaining home equity-typically between $50,000 and
$100,000.
EFFIE WAS ONLY THE Tip OF THE ICEBERG
Since Effie, we have screened and consulted with private attorneys on hun-
dreds of these cases, and this is clearly the tip of the iceberg. Chicago is among
those cities where the conditions have been ideal in creating a market for fore-
closure rescue fraud. Three interrelated factors have combined to create a "per-
fect storm" in this area.
First, in the past 10 years, foreclosure rates have skyrocketed. In Cook
County, the number of foreclosures increased from just a few thousand in the
early 1990's to more than 20,000 in 2006.2 This year, foreclosures are pro-
jected to rise higher still, to an all-time high of more than 30,000.' New court
calls and new judges have been added to the county foreclosure division as the
court system struggles to keep up with the numbers.4
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Second, until recently, property values have continued to rise in the Chicago
area. Thus, even though the past decade has seen a phenomenal growth in
loan flipping and other practices depleting homeowners' equity, a great deal of
additional equity has been built up by rising land values.
What this means is that many of the thousands of foreclosures cases filed in
Cook County involve properties where the value is significantly greater than
the debt. This distinguishes Chicago from certain other markets where a
much larger percentage of homeowners are "underwater" (i.e. the debt on the
home exceeds its value). Thus, in the greater Chicago area, many homes in
foreclosure are ripe targets for rescuers.
Third, and finally, foreclosure rescue deals have been made easy to finance -
through the straw buyer's new, higher loan - because of the boom in the
subprime mortgage market.
Not coincidentally, during the same 15-year period during which foreclosure
rates took off in Cook County, the national rate of subprime lending did as
well. In the early 1990's, the (too) easy credit known as subprime lending
made up only 5 percent of the mortgage market, and the volume of subprime
loans measured in the tens of billions of dollars.5
By 2006, subprime market share was more than 20 percent, and the volume of
subprime loans exceeded $600 billion. This boom (now becoming a bust) had
a lot to do with rising foreclosure rates; ironically, it was also of great help to
foreclosure rescuers, whose straw buyers had no problem getting easy-access
loans to fund rescue deals.
FIGHTING RESCUE FRAUD
As Effie and our many other rescue fraud clients have taught us, these cases are
often three (or more) cases in one. We often have to: (1) defend the eviction
case filed against our client, (2) defend the foreclosure case filed against the
straw buyer when it defaults on its loan, and (3) file our own quiet title action.
Sometimes there is also a bankruptcy or building court case involved. Motions
to consolidate are common.
4]
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Our quiet title actions raise a number of common law and statutory claims
that we use to challenge these transactions. At the core of our complaints is
our claim that the "rescue transaction" is not a true sale, but rather an equita-
ble mortgage.
The doctrine of equitable mortgage6 states that a "deed which on its face ap-
pears to be an absolute conveyance is to be considered a mortgage if it appears
that the parties intended it to serve only as a security."' The intent of the
parties is to be determined by consideration of any and all objective factors in
order to do equity.' Relevant factors include "[t]he relation of the parties, the
circumstances surrounding the transaction, the appearance of the transaction,
the adequacy of consideration and the situation of the parties after the
transaction."'
The court properly considers the conveyance to be an equitable mortgage
rather than an absolute conveyance when a desperate homeowner "sells" her
home for half of its value to a rescuer, whose pitch from the beginning is to
help the homeowner save her home from foreclosure. In order to avoid fore-
closure, she remains in her home making monthly payments - all with the
expectation that she will improve her credit and "buy" back her home in 12
months.
Courts in Illinois and elsewhere are upholding this claim of equitable mort-
gage."o The result is that title is restored to the homeowner, who owes the
straw buyer an equitable mortgage debt (i.e., the true monetary benefit con-
ferred to the homeowner).
Our cases begin with the equitable mortgage claim, but they do not end there.
If the transaction is an equitable mortgage, then it is covered by the Truth in
Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1501, et seq ("TILA").11 TILA requires numerous
disclosures (annual percentage rate, finance charge, amount financed, total of
payments and payment schedule), as well as notice of a three-day right to
cancel. 12
If such terms are not properly disclosed and such notice is not given (as they
never are in foreclosure rescue cases), the equitable mortgage can be rescinded,
creating a reduced debt amount owed by the homeowner to the straw buyer.13
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Other applicable claims include statutory and common law fraud, based upon
fraudulent misrepresentations or omissions of material fact."
Sometimes rescuers prevent homeowners from realizing they are conveying ti-
tle. Sometimes homeowners realize, but only at the last minute, when they
reasonably feel they have no alternative but to go forward. Or, homeowners
are led into the deal based upon false representations as to the monthly pay-
ments or buyback terms. And, in almost every case, there is a good argument
that the rescue deal violates the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Prac-
tices Act because it is inherently doomed to fail (i.e. re-conveyance of title to
the homeowner is little more than a pipe dream)."
Finally, other common law claims may apply, such as unconscionability,
breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment.
We have brought the above claims in a number of foreclosure rescue fraud
cases. Some cases are still in litigation. In others, we have survived motions to
dismiss and were able to settle. Clients have sometimes been able to stay in
their homes by paying the straw buyer or rescuer an agreed upon equitable
mortgage debt, in return for reconveyance of title. Other clients have not been
able to keep their homes but have settled for some or all of the home equity
they otherwise would have lost. In sum, we have been able to achieve good
results for our clients based upon available theories of recovery.
And yet, as in many areas of the law, there are serious obstacles to recovery.
Even when legal claims are available, not every victim of rescue fraud will find
an attorney in time or find one she can afford. Because these are very complex
and time-consuming cases, resources are a serious issue.
For these and other reasons, we began collaborating with the Office of Illinois
Attorney General more than two years ago. We knew there was a need for
state legislation to address this problem - not just to provide legal redress for
victimized homeowners, but, even more important, to prevent fraudulent or
unconscionable deals from occurring in the first place.
As the official enforcer of state consumer fraud statutes, the Attorney General's
Office had, predictably, begun to receive numerous complaints of foreclosure
rescue fraud. These complaints became a clear priority for the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office for several reasons, according to Tom James, Senior Assistant At-
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torney General and Consumer Counsel with the Consumer Fraud Bureau of
the Attorney General's Office."
Like us, the Attorney General's Office saw an increase in the proliferation of
rescue fraud as well as the push marketing targeting vulnerable homeowners.
Second, foreclosure rescue fraud transactions are so complex that they are inde-
cipherable to unsophisticated consumers who are desperate and would do al-
most anything to save their homes. Third, the subprime loan market fueling
the foreclosure rescue industry was basically unregulated, with little to no un-
derwriting. And finally, James said the Attorney General's Office saw multiple
victims in foreclosure rescue scams: (1) the homeowner, (2) the investor or
straw buyer, who may have been told s/he was helping the homeowner by
letting the program use her credit to get the rescue loan, and (3) the financial
institutions that made the loans.
Seeing the need for a legislative response, the Attorney General's Office began
drafting proposed legislation using other states' legislative efforts as a touch-
stone." Because foreclosure rescue fraud transactions are so complex, individ-
ual cases involving different victims and different rescuers are highly fact
intensive, and the Attorney General's Office did not believe that litigation
solely under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
was adequate.
According to James, legislation to regulate rescue fraud was necessary because
"you could chase individual rescuers until doomsday and never adequately ad-
dress the flood of activity."1"
In December 2005, Chicago Tribune reporter David Jackson shined welcome
light on a host of interrelated mortgage fraud schemes in his ongoing series,
"Mortgage Fraud: The New Street Hustle."" This series helped to galvanize
the interest of state policymakers. Early in 2006, the Attorney General filed
the first of several lawsuits against mortgage foreclosure rescuers.
Legislation was finally introduced in 2006 with input from many advocates,
including the Attorney General and our office. The legislation, known as the
Mortgage Rescue Fraud Act ("Act"), was introduced by Illinois State Senator
Jackie Collins.
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According to James, Senator Collins was a natural sponsor for the legislation
because she has long been an anti-predatory lending advocate and because her
district and those surrounding it have been heavily impacted by rising foreclo-
sures and foreclosure rescue fraud.2 0 The legislation passed both houses and
was signed into law by the Governor in June 2006.21
The Act, which became effective on January 1, 2007, includes several protec-
tions. Among the key provisions are protection for residential property owners
who are at risk of losing their homes because of foreclosure or nonpayment of
taxes (or who are more than 90 days delinquent on any loan that is secured by
the property) from the potentially unscrupulous behavior of "distressed prop-
erty consultants" and "distressed property purchasers." 2 2 The Act also estab-
lishes contractual requirements for both distressed property consultants and
distressed property purchasers to protect homeowners in these difficult finan-
cial situations.2 3 And the Act provides for both civil and criminal penalties for
any party that violates the Act.2 4
THE MORTGAGE RESCUE FRAUD ACT
A distressed property consultant is any person who solicits a homeowner, and
in exchange for payment of a fee, offers to perform services to save the home,
including stopping or postponing the foreclosure or tax sale; obtaining a for-
bearance agreement from the mortgagee; assisting the homeowner with rein-
statement or redemption of the mortgage; obtaining an extension of time
within which the homeowner may reinstate the mortgage; obtaining a waiver
of the acceleration clause in a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the
home; assisting the homeowner to obtain a loan or advance of funds; or avoid-
ing or ameliorating the impairment of the homeowner's credit resulting from
the recording of a notice of default or the foreclosure or tax sale.2 5
The Act requires that distressed property consultants use written contracts with
homeowners that state the exact nature of the services to be provided along
with the name, address and total compensation to be paid to the consultant. 26
The contract also must include two form notices: (1) a notice that the consult-
ant may not receive any money or ask for money until the services are com-
pletely performed and may not ask the homeowner to sign any lien, mortgage
or deed; and (2) a notice that the homeowner has the right to cancel the
consultant contract at any time until the consultant has performed every set-
8
Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol13/iss1/2
No. 1 * Winter 2008
vice in the contract along with an address that the homeowner may mail the
cancellation notice.27
The Act also prohibits distressed property consultants from collecting or de-
manding any fee until all of the consultant's promised services are fully per-
formed; collecting or demanding any fee that exceeds two monthly mortgage
payments or the most recent tax installment on the property, whichever is less;
personally or through a subsidiary or affiliate, taking any sort of lien or other
security interest in the property; taking any compensation from a third party
unless it is first fully disclosed to the homeowner; taking any power of attorney
from the homeowner for any purpose; and inducing or attempting to induce a
homeowner to enter a contract that does not comply with the requirements of
the Act.2 8
The portion of the act that drew the most opposition, however, was the effort
to regulate "distressed property purchasers" and "distressed property convey-
ances." A distressed property consultant may charge an up-front fee of $1,000
to offer bogus help arranging a workout with a lender. Paying such a consult-
ant $1,000 is usually tantamount to flushing it down the toilet, something a
distressed homeowner can ill afford to do. Nonetheless, losing a bogus $1,000
fee pales in comparison to loss of one's home and $50,000 to $100,000 of
home equity. That is the scale of harm resulting from the unregulated activi-
ties of distressed property purchasers.
DISTRESSED PROPERTY PURCHASERS
The Act defines a distressed property purchaser as "any person who acquires
any interest in fee in a distressed property while allowing the owner to possess,
occupy or retain any present or future interest in fee in the property, or any
person who participates in a joint venture or joint enterprise involving a dis-
tressed property conveyance."29
A "distressed property conveyance" is defined by the Act as "a transaction in
which an owner of a distressed property transfers an interest in fee in the dis-
tressed property; the acquirer of the property allows the owner of the distressed
property to occupy the property; and the acquirer of the property or a person
acting in participation with the acquirer of the property conveys or promises to
9
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convey an interest in fee back to the owner or gives the owner an option to
purchase the property at a later date.">3 o
The Act requires that contracts with distressed property purchasers be in writ-
ing and be executed before the execution of any instrument conveying the
property.3 1 Contracts with distressed property purchasers also must include a
wide-ranging number of requirements, including:
* signatures of both the homeowner and the purchaser, dated, witnessed
and notarized on a document containing every term negotiated be-
tween the homeowner and the purchaser,32
* a provision that the homeowner may terminate any lease back agree-
ment at any time without liability; 33 and
* a complete description of the terms of payment or other
consideration. 4
In addition, contracts with distressed property purchasers must include certain
form notices such as a homeowner's five-day right to cancel the contract, 3 and
a form notice explaining that the purchaser may not ask the homeowner to
sign any deed or other document until the right to cancel the contract has
ended.
If title to the distressed property will be transferred as part of the transaction,
the contract must also include a form notice stating: "As part of this transac-
tion, you are giving up title to your home."3 7 Finally, the purchaser must
record the contract with the recorder of deeds within ten days of the contract
execution,3 8 and any lease entered into pursuant to the contract with the pur-
chaser is terminable at will by the homeowner without liability.39
In addition to these contractual requirements, the Act imposes certain require-
ments on purchasers at two different stages of a rescue transaction: first, at the
inception of the transaction, when a homeowner and a purchaser enter a con-
veyance contract, and then, at the conclusion of the transaction, when a home-
owner repurchases the property.
When a homeowner and a purchaser enter a conveyance contract, the pur-
chaser must verify that the homeowner has the ability to pay for the monthly
lease payments and future re-purchase of the property before purchasing the
property.40 The purchaser must also purchase the property for at least 82
10
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percent of the property's fair market value or, in the alternative, pay off all
existing obligations on the property and establish the cost of re-purchase at no
greater than 125 percent of the amount of these payoffs."
At the conclusion of the rescue transaction, if a homeowner is unable to repur-
chase the property, the Act requires a purchaser to make a payment to the
homeowner so that the homeowner has received consideration in an amount
equal to at least 82 percent of the property's fair market value.42
VIOLATIONS AND REMEDIES
A violation of the Act constitutes an unlawful practice under the Illinois Con-
sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("CFA")." A homeowner
or consumer who suffers any loss by reason of a violation of the Act may bring
a civil action under the CFA to enforce the Act." The remedies and rights
provided under the Act are not exclusive and all other applicable claims, such
as for equitable mortgage, are reserved under the Act.4 5
The Act also explicitly provides for criminal penalties for any violations of the
Act. Any person who intentionally violates the Act commits the offense of
criminal mortgage rescue fraud, a class 2 felony.4 6
WHAT DOES THE FuTuRE HOLD?
No one is happier to see this law take effect than Presiding Judge Dorothy
Kirie Kinnaird of the Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County
who has presided over the Chancery Division during this recent period when
foreclosure rates have skyrocketed. -
Judge Kinnaird has done much to ensure that foreclosure defendants and vic-
tims of mortgage fraud are treated fairly in the court process, including being
able to raise valid legal claims that would save their homes and home equity.
"We are seeing an increasing number of separate cases to quiet title or counter-
claims to quiet title involving alleged mortgage rescue fraud," said Kinnaird.
"We estimate that there are at least 150 such cases currently pending in the
Chancery Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County. The Illinois Mort-
11
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gage Rescue Fraud Act is important in assisting the Court in filling the hereto-
fore legislative vacuum in resolving cases involving alleged rescue fraud."4 7
It has now been about a year since the Act went into effect. At this point, most
of the foreclosure rescue fraud clients contacting our office closed their deals
back in 2004, 2005 or 2006. Thus, it is still too early to measure the full
effect of the new law.
However, we have heard reports that several of our repeat defendants have
stopped transacting these deals. This is probably attributable to a combination
of factors: the Act, suits brought by the Attorney General and suits we and
other attorneys have filed on behalf of individual homeowners. Nonetheless,
the new statute appears to be one of the principal reasons-and perhaps the
main reason-why some rescuers are no longer doing business.
At the same time, we know of at least a couple of rescuers who are still at work.
If new rescue deals are closing in which the rescuers are complying with the
law, then the law has achieved its purpose in protecting the affected
homeowners.
However, we have seen several cases come through our doors where the rescue
transaction closed in 2007, and where the deals do not comply with the new
law. In one instance, the rescuer did not give any of the required procedural
protections (e.g., required notices), nor did it comply with any of the substan-
tive protections (e.g., ensuring that the monthly payments and repurchase
price are reasonably affordable to the homeowner).
Indeed, one of the written disclosures provided by the rescuer indicates its
knowledge that the homeowner probably could not afford to buy the home
back - good evidence for a summary judgment motion.
Since the Act preserves other claims, we will be filing our typical set of claims
(including equitable mortgage), but we will also be suing to enforce the new
law. As far as we know, this will be the first such lawsuit to do so.
Mr. Lindsey is the Supervisory Attorney in the Home Ownership Preservation Pro-
ject of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago. Ms. Weems is a
2005 graduate of Harvard Law School, and an Equal Justice Works Fellow in the
121
12
Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 2
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol13/iss1/2
No. 1 * Winter 2008
Home Ownership Preservation Project of the Legal Assistance Foundation of Met-
ropolitan Chicago.
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time," 765 ILCS 940/50(b)(4); from accepting or recording title to the property until after the
expiration of the homeowner's right to cancel the purchase contract, 765 ILCS 940/50(b)(6);
from failing to give the title back to the homeowner after the homeowner has fulfilled all the
requirements for re-purchase of the property, 765 ILCS 940/50(b)(7); from entering into a
conveyance contract with the homeowner where any party to the transaction is represented by
power of attorney, 765 ILCS 940/50(b)(9); from failing to assume or pay off all liens or interests
on the property immediately after the conveyance of the property, 765 ILCS 940/50(b)(10); and
from causing the property to be conveyed or encumbered without the knowledge or permission
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of the homeowner, or in any way frustrating the ability of the homeowner to complete the
conveyance back to the distressed property owner, 765 ILCS 940/50(b)(12).
43 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., 765 ILCS 940/55(a).
44 765 ILCS 940/55(b).
45 Id.
46 765 ILCS 940/60, 940/65.
47 Interview with Judge Dorothy Kinnaird, Presiding Judge, State of Illinois Circuit Court of
Cook County, Chancery Division, Chicago, IL (Oct. 19, 2007).
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